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Intelligent Agents: Authors, Makers, and Owners of
Computer-Generated Works in Canadian Copyright Law 
Rex M. Shoyama†
Introduction I. Intelligent Agents 
he term ‘‘intelligent agent’’ refers to an entity withanadian copyright law continues to undergo exten- T characteristics of intelligent human behaviour. 2C sive reform and reinterpretation due to rapid tech- Intelligent software agents (often deployed on thenological change. Computer-generated works present Internet for e-commerce related activities) have achallenges to copyright law, and there is a need to con- number of important properties, but the two most signif-sider these challenges in light of the ongoing maturing of icant are their (1) autonomous behaviour; and (2)artificial intelligence technologies. This paper discusses capacity for decentralized action. 3 An autonomoussome of the implications of the application of copyright system is often defined as one that has the ability toto works created by ‘‘intelligent agents’’. A specific control its own actions and act without the interventionexample that will be revisited throughout this paper is of humans or other agents. 4 Intelligent agents act in athe use of intelligent agents to gather, summarize, and decentralized manner if they work together to solve apresent news that is available on the Internet. The intelli- complex problem, even though there is no central con-gent news agent example is a particularly useful one to trol over the agents and they are distributed in differentconsider for the reason that it has vast commercial appli- parts of an environment. 5 These technical characteristicscability and has the potential to be the subject of intel- of intelligent agents help to make them very efficient atlectual property litigation. 1 searching for and organizing information on a wide-scale
The central objective of this article is to propose a in environments such as the Internet. 6 Intelligent agents
clarification of copyright law as applied to works created thus have the potential to be very useful in many prac-
by intelligent agents. In Part I, the concepts of artificial tical applications and will do the work that humans
intelligence and intelligent agents are introduced. Part II cannot or do not want to do.
identifies the challenges that are presented to the tests of There are a number of legal uncertainties that resultoriginality and authorship in the application of copyright from the introduction of intelligent agents onto theto works generated by intelligent agents. It is argued that Internet. Two examples include the determination ofworks created by intelligent agents may meet the tests of contract formation (when agents are introduced asoriginality and authorship. It is also argued that the con- intermediaries between contracting parties) and liabilitycepts of ‘‘author’’, ‘‘owner’’, and ‘‘maker’’ are distinct from for the misbehaviour of agents. 7 These legal uncertaintiesone another in Canadian copyright law. Part III addresses are not merely academic musings. One only needcopyright policy arguments. It is shown that intelligent examine a case such as eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc. 8agents may be authors of works but not owners of copy- (which involved the use of software ‘‘bots’’ by Bidder’sright, and that there is no clear candidate who should be Edge to create a database of items available on otherdesignated the maker of works created by intelligent auction Web sites by copying information on those Webagents. The role of the public domain is also considered, sites) to understand that intelligent agents pose very prac-and it is concluded that the best solution is for no copy- tical legal concerns.right ownership to be vested in anyone. Database protec-
tion legislation is examined in Part IV. The paper con- As intelligent agent technologies advance, it
cludes with some suggestions that should be considered becomes more and more possible for computers to be
as part of the ongoing process of Canadian copyright law ‘‘creative’’, in the sense that their output will decreasingly
reform. resemble traditional computer output. As natural lan-
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130 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
guage processing capabilities increase, intelligent agents In addition to the valuable information output by
will create more ‘‘human-like’’ output. For example, as intelligent agents, the agent may also accumulate knowl-
early as 1993, Scott French attempted to create a heuristi- edge within its own internal ‘‘knowledge base’’. Simply
cally based expert system that would write in the style of put, a knowledge base is a set of representations of facts
a human author. 9 about the world. 17 For example, as a shopping agent
travels the world (the Internet), it may gather valuableIt is logical, then, for owners and users of intelligent marketing and customer preference information. 18 Aagents to want to exploit value from and protect the news-gathering agent might gather knowledge about thecreations that are output by the agent and the knowl- currency and/or breadth of subject matter found at par-edge that the agent has accumulated. As a result, there is ticular news Web sites. 19 As this type of information ispotential for dispute and litigation in situations where incorporated into its knowledge base, the agent willthe owner or user of an agent feels that a third party has ‘‘learn’’ and adjust its behaviour. This constant mutationmisappropriated the work done by the agent. Who has by agents (in a manner comparable to viruses) is some-the legal right in the creations and knowledge generated times referred to as ‘‘polymorphism’’. 20 Thus, agents willby an intelligent agent? Are copyright laws nuanced act in unpredictable ways and produce unpredictableenough to deal with the struggle over the ownership of results, further complicating the legal analysis of copy-content that will result from the use of intelligent agents? right in the works generated by the agents.Since the creations in question are generated by an agent
through its own autonomous actions, a fundamental The question of ownership over the creations and
issue is the copyrightability of computer-generated knowledge generated by intelligent agents may be made
works. There are a number of interesting examples more difficult where there are competing ownership
already in existence that illustrate the difficulty in claims of a number of different parties who are
applying copyright law to computer-generated works. somehow associated with the intelligent agent. 21 For
example, one party may patent certain technologies usedProfessor Harold Cohen has created an artificial
in the agent, while another party may copyright theintelligence-based software program called ‘‘AARON’’
software code composing the agent. If the agent containsthat creates visual art. 10 By simply running the AARON
the personal/private data of other third parties, theseprogram on a computer, a user of the program can have
third parties may have some claims to that data. There isAARON create original paintings with no user-input
also an end-user that has paid money for the right to usewhatsoever. Each painting that a particular copy of the
the agent. Finally, there is also likely an investor who hasAARON program creates is unique and different from
been instrumental in the creation of the intelligent agentany other painting that is created by it or any other copy
in the first place. Do any of these parties have a properof AARON running on another computer. Computer
copyright ownership claim to the works generated bygenerated musical compositions 11 and fractals 12 are
intelligent agents?other examples of works that challenge current copy-
right law. It is unclear whether copyright exists in such
computer-generated works, and who the rightful owner
of such a copyright would be. II. Canadian Copyright Law 
On the Internet, there is an increasing demand for
‘‘news bots’’ that will deliver news feeds and headlines n Canada, the Subcommittee on the Revisions of the
from various news sources and Web sites around the I Copyright tabled a report22 in 1985 that considered
world directly to the reader. 13 In an effort to increase the computer-assisted creations of works and concluded that
efficiency of news searching and to better personalize copyright in any protected work should be vested in the
access to news on the Internet, researchers have under- individual or entity principally responsible for the
taken to create intelligent agents that will have, in addi- making of the work. 23 In the United States, Congress
tion to numerous other features, the ability to summa- created the National Commission on New Technolog-
rize the news items that they gather. 14 In a clever eight- ical Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) in 1976 to
minute flash media movie entitled EPIC 2014, 15 a hypo- address the problem.24 CONTU came to the conclusion
thetical future merger of Google and Amazon is that the user of the program is the author of the work
presented wherein ‘‘Googlezon’’ is born. Googlezon con- and expressed certainty that for works created with com-
structs news stories dynamically, stripping facts from puter assistance, a computer could not contribute to
numerous content sources and recombining them to authorship of the works created. 25 However, in 1986, the
create a customized news story for a particular user. For Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
example, in putting together a domestic news story, noted that CONTU’s conclusion that computers are
Googlezon could emphasize the international aspects inert tools of creation may be misleading, and raised the
and implications of the story for a reader who is inter- possibility for authorship in computers. 26 The technolog-
ested in international news. 16 Whether or not copyright ical context and surrounding circumstances have
subsists in such computer-generated news summaries is changed dramatically in recent years. Two major
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First, nearly two decades have passed, and artificial exercise of skill and judgment will necessarily involve
intelligence technologies have advanced rapidly in intellectual effort. The exercise of skill and judgment
recent years, to the point that intelligent agents are not required to produce the work must not be so trivial that
so much assisting the creation of works, but generating it could be characterized as a purely mechanical exer-
them autonomously. OTA’s concern that the analysis by cise.’’ 34
CONTU begs the question of whether the computer is a
What are the specific implications of this ruling forcreator or not27 is even more apparent now than it was
intelligent agents? First of all, it should be noted thatin 1986. The same may be said about the analysis of the
there is some debate as to whether the Supreme CourtSubcommittee on the Revisions of the Copyright in
has truly created a standard of originality that lies inCanada.
between the two competing models of copyright. It has
Second, the data at the disposal of intelligent agents been argued by one commentator that, ‘‘[t]he level of
on the Internet is far more dynamic and decentralized originality as defined by the Supreme Court is function-
than could have been imagined twenty years ago. The ally almost impossible to distinguish from the ‘modicum
manner in which data and instructions are presented to of creativity’ approach of Feist’’. 35 Whether or not
agents is much different from what is normally associ- Canada has adopted a standard of ‘‘creativity’’ similar to
ated with a ‘‘computer-assisted’’ production. There is a the United States may affect the ability to attach copy-
distinct difference between a computer program that right to works produced by an agent.
requires a person to control and supply information to it,
In CCH Canadian, in holding that case summariesand intelligent agents that can autonomously gather
are original, the Court stated that ainformation from numerous sources in a highly dynamic
and decentralized environment such as the Internet. The . . . summary of judicial reasons is not simply a copy of the
significance of the decentralized and highly distributed original reasons. Even if the summary often contains the
nature of many intelligent agent programs is that the same language as the judicial reasons, the act of choosing
which portions to extract and how to arrange them in theunpredictability of the resulting works is exacerbated by
summary requires an exercise of skill and judgment. 36the fact that agents may collaborate with and delegate
tasks to other software agents and do so across multiple In fact, a close analogy can be made between the
Web sites. 28 activity of an intelligent agent that summarizes news and
that of the publishers in the CCH Canadian case. Just asCan and should copyright be applied to works gen-
with the summary of judicial reasons in the CCH Cana-erated by intelligent agents? If the answer is yes, then
dian case, an intelligent news agent must choose thewho should be assigned ownership of the copyright? The
portions of information available to it on the Internetanswer to these questions depends on whether the
and arrange them into a news summary readable to aworks meet the test of originality, and whether intelli-
human. In fact, the activity of an intelligent news agentgent agents may be considered ‘‘authors’’ under the
appears to exhibit a greater level of originality than aCanadian Copyright Act. 29 There is no explicit reference
summary of judicial reasons pertaining to a single case.to intelligent agents or computer-generated works in the
The news agent is required to select from numerousCopyright Act, so there is little direct legislative gui-
sources of information and determine the relevancy ofdance. 30 Canada is in the process of extensive copyright
each instead of summarizing one single document. Thus,reform, but there does not appear to be anything on the
it seems that computer-generated works will not necessa-agenda dealing with this particular problem.31 Addition-
rily be held to be unoriginal in Canada.ally, the Copyright Act does not define the term ‘‘orig-
inal’’, nor does it define the term ‘‘author’’, so it is up to
An important consequence of the incorporation ofthe courts to determine what exactly these terms mean.
artificial intelligence into intelligent agents is that they
will increasingly make decisions and judgments that are
unpredictable. 37 The agents will not act in a determin-Originality istic manner, like regular software, and it will be highly
Canada’s test for originality was recently considered unlikely that any two agents will create the same output.
by the Supreme Court in its decision in CCH Canadian Each agent will likely develop its own ‘‘writing style’’ as it
v. Law Society of Upper Canada. 32 This case had been traverses the Internet, gathering information and
heavily anticipated as being a decision that would be a building on its knowledge base. As its knowledge base
landmark ruling on what has often been characterized as expands, the agent will ‘‘learn’’ and increasingly behave
a battle between the ‘‘sweat of brow’’ understanding of in a unique manner. The result of this non-deterministic
copyright and the ‘‘creativity’’ model of copyright. 33 The behaviour is the creation of information that neither
Court ultimately concluded that the correct interpreta- another agent nor another human is likely to create. This
tion of the meaning of ‘‘original’’ falls in between these is significant because it is arguable that the test for crea-
two competing models of copyright, stating that an exer- tivity (thus showing originality) may be formulated in
cise of skill and judgment is required to attract copyright the following manner: ‘‘would another author likely





























































132 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
However, there are some problems with the analogyAuthorship 
between cameras and intelligent agents. First, a photogra-
It seems then that there is nothing in Canadian law pher may control lighting, camera angles, and the posi-
that precludes computer-generated works from copy- tioning of objects in order to construct a final image.
right protection on the basis of a lack of originality. This is not true for users of intelligent agents. Users of
However, can an intelligent agent be found an ‘‘author’’ intelligent agents have little or no control over the final
for the purposes of copyright? A first blush, this might work created by agents. Also, unlike photographs, there
seem like a ridiculous proposition. It certainly seems are competing claims to authorship (such as by the
implicit in the Copyright Act that authors must be programmer of the agent), and the user has no precon-
human.39 It is highly doubtful that the legislature con- ceived conception of the final work that is created. 47
templated giving copyright to non-humans. However,
The same commentator who argues that computer-even though the answer to this question may seem self-
generated works are analogous to photographs notes thatevident, it is still a question worth examining because
true artificial intelligence is ‘‘a mode of expression whosethe exercise of determining authorship is fundamental to
capabilities, contours, and directions are even less pre-determining the copyright status of a work. The impor-
dictable than the future of computer programs . . .’’. 48tant notion of authorship is often neglected, even though
Even based on this commentator’s own description ofit grounds copyright. 40 A close examination of the con-
artificial intelligence, a user could never possibly ‘‘con-cept of authorship reveals that this concept is not as
struct’’ the final output of an intelligent agent due to theunambiguous as one might think, and thus offers some
unpredictable nature of the computer-generated work.insight into Canadian copyright legislation.
Thus, the analogy between camera and intelligent agent
From the Copyright Act, it appears that if a human is not a particularly strong one.
author cannot be identified, there may be no copy-
Originality is the touchstone for determiningright. 41 At the same time, as discussed already, there is a
authorship, and a computer program user who contrib-very strong argument that intelligent agents are creating
utes little or no creative control over the final workoriginal works that should attract copyright protection.
should not be considered an author. If the individualThis causes tension because originality is the overarching
who introduces originality into a work is the properstandard of authorship, 42 but at the same time, it is diffi-
author, it seems then that an argument may be advancedcult to identify a human author for computer-generated
in favour of delineating computer programmers as theworks. 43
authors of computer-generated works. However, due to
It might be argued that while intelligent agents the highly unpredictable nature of intelligent agents, it is
exhibit the requisite characteristics to be the author, they questionable whether or not a programmer should be
are in fact still just a tool being used by a person who is considered to be the one who introduced the original
making the necessary arrangements for the creation of expression into the works. The programmer cannot pos-
the work. Are the users of intelligent agents the proper sibly conceive what output the intelligent agents will
authors of the works generated by intelligent agents? create. 49 In addition to the questionable claim that pro-
One analogy that has been employed by commentators grammers are the source of originality in the works,
in order to argue in favour of granting authorship to the there is an even more immediate doctrinal problem
users of computer programs is that of a person tape- facing the authorship claim of programmers. Authors are
recording a live performance of music. It has been generally considered to be those who cause the fixation
argued that because the person tape-recording the per- of the work, and programmers do not do so. 50
formance is the author of the recording despite having a
The question is still open as to whether a non-limited contribution (pressing the record button), then a
human intelligent agent qualifies as an ‘‘author’’ inuser that simply clicks a mouse button should similarly
Canada. The legislature has nowhere explicitly definedbe considered the author of computer-generated
an ‘‘author’’ in the Copyright Act as having to be human.output. 44 This particular argument does not have much
In leaving the term ‘‘author’’ undefined, to what extentweight in Canada, due to the existence of what are
was this concept expected to be stretched in the future?51known as ‘‘neighbouring rights’’ in the Copyright Act.
Regardless of the level of artificial intelligence actuallyThe performer of live music is given the right to fix the
exhibited by agents, and though they are easy subjectsperformance and reproduce that fixation. 45
for anthropomorphism, it is clear that agents are
Another analogy made by commentators arguing machines and not human.52 Laws usually only apply to
for authorship to be attributed to users of computer humans or juridical persons, and not machines.
programs is that of a photographer who takes a photo
using a highly sophisticated camera. 46 Modern comput- International law is also somewhat unhelpful with
erized cameras have advanced image-processing func- respect to this issue. A very strong argument can be made
tions and automated features like autofocus that have for the requirement that an author be a natural person,
the ability to make the job of photography little more by looking at the text of the Berne Convention. The





























































Intelligent Agents: Authors, Makers and Owners of Computer Generated Works in Canadian Copyright Law 133
(b) in relation to a sound recording, the person byimal requirement for the protection of moral rights, 53
whom the arrangements necessary for the first fixa-and according moral rights to an intelligent agent does
tion of the sounds are undertakennot make sense. It has also been argued that human
authorship is, ‘‘[t]he leitmotiv running through all the s. 2.11  For greater certainty, the arrangements referred to in
paragraph (b) of the definition ‘‘maker’’ in section 2, as thatcategories of works presently protected by the Conven-
term is used in section 19, and in the definition ‘‘eligibletion’’. 54
maker’’ in section 79, include arrangements for entering
into contracts with performers, financial arrangements andConversely, it might be argued that the Berne Con-
technical arrangements required for the first fixation of thevention is in fact neutral on this topic. First of all, much
sounds for a sound recording. [Emphasis Added] 59like the Canadian Copyright Act, the Berne Convention
does not define the term ‘‘author’’. The reasoning behind Cinematographic works and sound recordings are
this lack of definition has been pointed to as evidence of similar to computer-generated works in the sense that
Berne’s neutrality on this topic, since ‘‘[t]he Berne Con- vesting ownership in the author poses problems. Indi-
vention Guide states that this is because ‘national laws vidual contributors to a film or a sound recording are
diverge widely, some recognizing only natural persons as certainly ‘‘authors’’, but the multiplicity of creators
authors, while others treat certain legal entities as copy- makes the management of copyright in the final work
right owners.’’’ 55 Legal persons such as corporations are unwieldy. 60 The Canadian solution to this problem is to
clearly non-human. vest copyright in a ‘‘maker’’, the person who is respon-
sible for making the arrangements necessary to createAt first glance, the copyright legislation of the
the work. That ‘‘person’’ can be a corporation. 61 This isUnited Kingdom appears to be quite helpful, since it is
different from the approach in the United States, whichone of the few countries in the world that has enacted
explicitly gives corporations that produce cinemato-specific copyright provisions with respect to computer-
graphic works or sound recordings ‘‘authorship’’ statusgenerated works. 56 In the U.K., the author of the work is
under the work-for-hire doctrine. Canadian law makes it‘‘the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the
clear that a ‘‘maker’’ is distinct and different from ancreation of the work are undertaken’’. 57 This would
‘‘author’’. 62appear to settle the issue in the U.K. A policy decision
was made there, presumably on the basis that it simply
In many cases, the ‘‘maker’’ will have made financialdoes not make sense to make the agent the bearer of
and logistical contributions that make the production ofrights, and thus a human author is deemed for com-
the work possible, but will have not made any creative orputer-generated works. There is nothing wrong with
technical contribution. 63 While the maker retains copy-making a decision that machines cannot be rights
right over the final cinematographic work or soundholders. However, a problem does lie in the wording of
recording, the individual contributors to the work as athe statute. It conflates authorship with the vesting of
whole remain ‘‘authors’’ and retain copyright to theirownership, which leads to considerable incoherence. 58
individual contributions. In this sense, the Canadian lawJust because the U.K. legislature has decided that a par-
is relatively more coherent in terms of its treatment ofticular human may be the best choice for ownership of a
authorship than the United States, since it does not con-copyright computer-generated work, it does not directly
flate it with ownership.follow that this human should be found the ‘‘author’’.
The lack of existence of a human author for a given Having said that, the Canadian Copyright Act is not
work does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that an without its ambiguities and inconsistencies. For example,
author does not exist. At the risk of being repetitive, subsection 10(2) of the Act deems the author of a photo-
owners are not necessarily authors. graph to be the person who owns the initial negative or,
if there is no negative, the owner of the initial photo-
graph. A corporation who owns a photograph or nega-
tive may be the author of a photograph. This is an incon-Authors, Makers, and Owners 
sistency that conflates authorship with ownership thatWhile there is no legislation specific to computer- likely has its roots in a misunderstanding of the tech-generated works in the Copyright Act, there are some nology behind photography and the relationship pho-provisions specific to cinematographic works and sound tographers have with their cameras, and is an inconsis-recordings. Sections 2 and 2.11 of the Copyright Act tency that may soon be remedied. 64 An interim reportcontain very similar wording to subsection 9(3) of the on copyright reform released by the Standing Com-U.K. Copyright, Design and Patent Act within it. How- mittee on Canadian Heritage in May 2004 states:ever, the Canadian legislature appears to have intended
to avoid the conflation of authorship with the vesting of The Committee feels that photographers should be given
copyright protection in their works equal to that enjoyed byownership by specifically defining a ‘‘maker’’:
other artists. Historically, photographs have been treated dif-
s. 2 ‘‘maker’’ means ferently from other categories of works because they were
(a) in relation to a cinematographic work, the person perceived to be more mechanical and less creative than
by whom the arrangements necessary for the other art forms. This idea is outmoded and inappropriately
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One can see why this inconsistency in the treatment use of ‘‘electronic agents’’ had been contemplated and
of ‘‘authorship’’ came to be. Since it was believed (at the legislated for in the Uniform Electronic Commerce Act
time that subsection 10(2) of the Copyright Act was (UECA), 68 but since the context for the drafting of this
enacted) that photographers were not authors (since they legislation was Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) trans-
did not clearly make original and expressive contribu- actions, the UECA is not very useful when applied to
tions to photographs), these works would not be pro- agents on the Internet. While ‘‘electronic agents’’ were
tected under copyright unless someone was designated contemplated within the UECA, ‘‘intelligent agents’’ that
the author. A copyrightable work requires an author. were more than an extension of human action were
That is why the notion of authorship is so important. not. 69 However, a number of commentators have consid-
The only solution at the time was to deem the owner of ered the issues of ‘‘electronic agents as persons’’ within
the photograph the author of the work; otherwise, no the context of contract law, and their analysis is helpful
copyright would subsist in photographs at all. As noted for thinking about the meaning of authorship and own-
already, this inconsistency is likely soon to be remedied, ership in copyright law.
as proposed amendments to the Copyright Act will Cognitive science begins with the assumption thatensure that the photographer is the author of his or her the human mind is computational in nature, and thusphotograph. can be modeled as a computer program.70 However, the
There are three main points to note here. First, the attribution of legal personality to entities embodied in
Canadian legislature has appeared to try to avoid con- computer software is questionable due to the lack of
flating authorship with the vesting of ownership, by evidence of sentience or consciousness in such entities. 71
defining ‘‘makers’’ for particular specific types of works It is arguable whether or not intelligent agents possess
(such as cinematographic works). Thus, the concepts of the ability to process meanings (an attribute referred to
‘‘author’’, ‘‘maker’’, and ‘‘owner’’ are distinct from each as ‘‘intentionality’’). 72 For example, it is questionable
other. Second, nothing in the Copyright Act or in inter- whether or not it can be claimed that the exercise of
national treaties explicitly requires an ‘‘author’’ to be summarizing news items gathered from the Internet
human. Canadian case law also does not seem to pre- endows intelligent agents ‘‘skill and judgment’’. This may
clude the possibility. Third, intelligent agents appear just be a case of ‘‘skill and judgment’’ being displayed by
capable of meeting the ‘‘originality’’ requirement in the intelligent agents in producing useful outcomes that
works they create. What then, should be done with have been designed by a computer programmer. This
respect to works that are authored by intelligent agents? type of philosophical debate has raged on for years in the
fields of artificial intelligence and cognitive science.
Fortunately, this debate does not have to beIII. Canadian Copyright Policy resolved here. It is the owner who is the bearer of rights
and not the author. As a result, while questions such as
Intelligent Agents Can Be Authors, But ‘‘do intelligent agents possess the ability to process and
Not Owners understand meanings?’’ may be relevant to the question
of ownership, they are not relevant to the question ofn order to maintain coherence within copyright law,
authorship. 73 A lack of consciousness or ‘‘intentionality’’I authorship must be understood to be a distinct con-
on the part of intelligent agents does not derogate fromcept from ownership. As a matter of copyright doctrine,
their ability to produce works that meet the test of origi-it seems that information generated by intelligent agents
nality under Canadian copyright law. At the same time,meets the requirements necessary for copyright protec-
‘‘intentionality’’, consciousness, emotion, property rights,tion. Apart from the fact that intelligent agents are not
and humanity are all concepts that may be relevant to annatural persons, they appear to be good candidates for
inquiry into the qualities that make a bearer of rights onebeing authors. However, it is not clear whether assigning
that is afforded the protection of social institutions. 74ownership of the rights associated with authorship to the
The relevance of such concepts in determining whetheragent makes sense. The conflation of authorship with the
an entity is a bearer of rights becomes clear when onevesting of ownership and the confusion surrounding the
considers the assignment of legal rights to non-humans.nature of the concept of authorship is exacerbated in the
For example, these concepts would play a role in deter-context of intelligent agent technology because the term
mining whether or not higher order mammals should‘‘agent’’ has a general legal meaning. One definition of
have stronger legal rights. 75 Thus a lack of ‘‘intention-agency is ‘‘the relationship which results from the mani-
ality’’ and consciousness may be a barrier to the grantingfestation of consent, by one person to another, that the
of copyright ownership rights to intelligent agents.other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control,
and consent by the other so act’’. 66 The phrase ‘‘intelli- Pragmatic considerations relating to the assignment
gent agent’’ may be misleading, as it may carry such legal of ownership to intelligent agents also help to illustrate
connotations of the term ‘‘agent’’. 67 the distinction between authorship and ownership in
In Canada, there has been some attempt to legislate copyright law. First, who would enforce the copyright
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intelligent agent has no standing to sue for damages in contracting of the artists who appear on the recording as
court. 76 Secondly, an intelligent agent is not capable of well as making other financial and technical arrange-
transferring rights to others. Even if it was conceptually ments; the programmer has little to do with a news
possible for agents to enter into licensing agreements summary created by the agent and little control over the
with each other and with humans, and to negotiate for agent. Granting ownership to the programmer is also
the transfer of rights, the assignment of copyright must problematic for the reason that it would mean that the
be in writing in Canada. 77 programmer might automatically own everything the
program was capable of generating. 80It seems then that an intelligent agent can be an
author, but not an owner. This is problematic because in
A case might be made for the investor/owner of thegeneral, copyright vests first ownership in the author.
intelligent agent technology. In the sense that an investorPolicymakers have two options within copyright law to
has made financial and technical arrangements for thedeal with this problem. Either nobody owns any copy-
creation of an intelligent agent’s technology, the investorright in works created by intelligent agents, or the Cana-
may be close to the definition of ‘‘maker’’ in the Copy-dian legislature will have to create a specific exception
right Act. However, the investor in this case has no handfor computer-generated works in the Copyright Act. If
in the logistics directly associated with the generation ofthe latter option is chosen, policymakers will need to
the work that is to be protected. Makers of cinemato-avoid conflating authorship and ownership to maintain
graphic works and sound recordings hire individuals toconsistency and coherence in the Act. Thus the owner of
create for them with a conception of what the final workthe copyright should take the form of a ‘‘maker’’. If spe-
will be. More importantly, from a policy perspective, tocific laws are not enacted for computer-generated works
give ownership of the copyright to the investors shouldand intelligent agents, then it is not for the courts to
make one pause and ask whether there is a point incarve out an exception to the general requirement that
having copyright at all. The investor’s only hand in thean author be given first ownership.
creation of the works is the provision of money. If copy-
right ownership is given to investors, then it seems that
instead of copyright law, we will have succeeded in cre-There Is No Clear Legitimate Maker 
ating ‘‘producers’ investment laws’’. 81For ownership over works created by intelligent
agents to vest in anyone, there must be a clear candidate The users of intelligent agents likely have the best
who would meet the requirements of being a ‘‘maker’’. claim for ownership as ‘‘makers’’. Users might be consid-
Interestingly, the Subcommittee on the Revisions of ered most directly responsible for fixing the work in
Copyright stated back in 1985 that where data banks tangible form.82 If users provide the computing hard-
were built up from elements from many sources and it ware, telecommunications links, and electrical power
was impossible to identify human authors, ownership necessary for intelligent agents to create works, they
should be vested in the individual or entity primarily might be considered to be primarily responsible for the
responsible for the arrangements undertaken for making arrangements undertaken to create the resulting works. 83
the compilation. 78 The output of an intelligent news Users may also select, arrange, edit, and polish the output
agent who summarizes information gathered from of the intelligent agents. 84 Despite the fact that users of
numerous sources on the Internet is somewhat analo- intelligent agents might be the closest to meeting the
gous to the hypothetical posed by the Subcommittee, requirements of being a ‘‘maker’’ out of all other avail-
and the phrase ‘‘primarily responsible for the arrange- able options, they are still not clear candidates for being
ments’’ is very much the same language used in the brought into copyright legislation as such. For one thing,
definition of ‘‘maker’’ in section 2 of the Copyright Act. unlike recording studios and movie production compa-
Should Parliament extend the definition of ‘‘maker’’ to nies who make the market for creative works, the users
address works created by intelligent agents? of intelligent agents are not ultimate market-makers who
With respect to computer-generated works, some of take great financial risks for the creation of the works. 85
the options that have been suggested for ownership by Additionally, it is not clear that users require further
commentators include incentive through copyright in the output of intelligent
agents, in addition to the copyright protection that the(a) the programmer/designer of the agent,
user may claim in expression he or she personally con-(b) the investor/owner of the agent technology, and
tributes to the final product. 86
(c) the user of the agent. 79
In some sense, the programmer/designer appears to A natural tendency is to attempt to somehow fit
be directly responsible for making the arrangements nec- these works into the penumbra of rights within copy-
essary for the making of the work. However, at the same right to ensure that the works will be exploited. Put
time, while the programmer is intimately tied to the another way, notwithstanding the fact that no human
technology in question, he or she is also clearly divorced author can readily be designated for such works, there is
from the particular works created by the agent. A maker a natural urge to vest the ownership right in somebody,
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have. 87 However, it may not really be necessary for copy- continual balancing act between the benefit of incen-
right to vest in anyone. tives produced by copyright protection and the increased
cost of access to the very raw material that feeds new
works. Many commentators feel that the recent trend inThe Public Domain: Nobody Should be both Canada and the United States has been to expandthe Owner and strengthen copyright law as a knee-jerk reaction to
It has been argued that the output of an intelligent the challenges that digital technologies present, 96
agent is likely copyrightable, and that nothing precludes resulting in what might be termed an ‘‘information arms
the agent from being an ‘‘author’’. It has also been argued race’’. 97
that neither the agent itself (nor any other person) is a
To grant copyright to someone such as a user ofparticularly good candidate for owning the rights to the
intelligent agents for no other reason than on the basisinformation generated by the agent. The agent is not a
that users of intelligent agents must be motivated togood candidate for practical and economic reasons,
bring the computer-generated works into public circula-while the natural persons associated with the works in
tion98 is an extreme proposal. The law and policy ofquestion are not proper authors or makers of the works.
copyright always requires a balancing of legal rights withThe user of the intelligent agent appears to present the
the public interest and a consideration of the effect thatbest case for being a possible ‘‘maker’’ of the works.
broadening the subject matter of copyright will have on
Is there a good policy reason in favour of giving the the public domain. Preferably, such consideration would
user ownership? It may be argued that the best reason to include economic analysis on whether such legislation
allocate ownership to the user of the agent is to make addresses an actual market failure or an actual lack of
sure that the work is brought into public circulation and incentives for production. 99
should be done ‘‘if for no other reason’’ than this. 88 If
If none of the ownership options are suitable, thethere is no copyright protection at all, it is argued that
user should not gain ownership simply because it is thenobody has incentive to share the work and may with-
‘‘best of the worst’’ available options. It is importanthold the work from the public domain, 89 and that this is
when dealing with possible extensions of intellectualnot in the public interest.
property rights into new realms to ask whether these
But what exactly is the ‘‘public domain’’? Just as extensions still bear the hallmarks of classic intellectual
there are many definitions of property, there are many property. 100 Ultimately, it is the creativity of authors that
definitions of the public domain. 90 Professor Litman has copyright seeks to foster, and thus, to give undue weight
described the public domain as ‘‘a commons that to the economic incentive that should be given to
includes those aspects of copyrighted works which copy- ‘‘makers’’ and ‘‘owners’’ would be a mistake. It is true
right does not protect . . .’’. 91 This description of the that there is a need to further innovation and invest-
public domain as an ‘‘information commons’’ is very ment, but to disproportionately value these aspects while
apposite in the context of information that is available to ignoring doctrinal difficulties means that we are no
intelligent agents on the Internet. Intelligent agents that longer within the proper ambit of copyright and may
create news summaries from information gathered from actually be sacrificing the public interest by taking an
numerous sources on the Internet illustrate both the unbalanced approach to copyright.
type of raw material in the commons that authors rely
upon in order to create new works and how it is that
authors rely on such raw material. 92 The Supreme Court
has recently emphasized the necessity of a vigorous IV. Database Protection 
public domain, and the role that authorship plays in
n theory, many of the doctrinal difficulties discussedmaintaining a balance between the public interest and I above might be alleviated through the introduction ofobtaining a just reward for the creator in stating that,
sui generis database protection laws. Database protection‘‘[w]hen an author must exercise skill and judgement to
laws would specifically protect the investment made byground originality in a work, there is a safeguard against
database producers, which as discussed already, appearsthe author being overcompensated for his or her
to be the real thrust behind the argument that the assig-work’’. 93
nation of copyright for works created by intelligentSome commentators have emphasized that the
agents to a person would be in the public interest.public interest is not necessarily served by the public
domain. 94 This is likely true. Copyright protection is nec- The European Union (EU) adopted a Directive for
essary in order to create incentives for the creation of the legal protection of databases on March 11, 1996, 101
works that will populate the public domain. At the same but Canada is unlikely to follow suit (at least anytime
time, if the public domain is related to the concern that soon). In a report released by Industry Canada on the
excessive copyright may raise the cost of access to infor- status and future of Canadian copyright reform, the issue
mational resources, then the public domain represents a of database protection was deemed to be one that fell
space that is bounded by the minimum intellectual within their most long-term reform agenda. 102 Even if
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the works created by an agent even qualify as a that copyright is flexible enough to deal with the legal
‘‘database’’ under EU-like legislation?103 difficulties presented by intelligent agents. It is true that
copyright has ‘‘survived’’ the challenges that photog-A close reading of a set of four decisions released by
raphy, sound recordings, and broadcasting have posedthe European Court of Justice (ECJ) on November 9,
for notions of authorship. 108 However, intelligent agents2004 appears to show that information created by intelli-
reveal that copyright law, as malleable as it is, can only begent agents may not in fact fit the definition of
stretched so far. The idea that copyright is flexible‘‘database’’ under EU database legislation. Cases C-46/02,
enough to incorporate computer-generated works wasC-203/02, C-338/02, and C-444/02 all deal with sporting
mainly premised on the idea that artificial intelligenceschedules and fixtures used for the purpose of betting,
technology had not reached a point where a machine (orand are the first ECJ judgments to interpret the EU
agent) could truly be considered an author. 109 Timesdatabase directive. 104 One of the key holdings of the ECJ
change.was that sui generis protection is reserved only for
databases for which it can be shown that there has been In this paper, it has been argued that intelligent
a substantial investment in the obtaining, verification, or agents are not prohibited explicitly from being ‘‘authors’’
presentation of their contents. The investment must also under Canadian copyright law, and that they are capable
have been made and used for seeking out existing mater- of creating ‘‘original’’ works as interpreted by Canadian
ials and collecting them in a database (not for the crea- case law. International law also does not appear to pro-
tion of materials that make up the contents of a hibit the output of intelligent agents from being deemed
database). material that may be copyrighted. At the same time,
Thus, under EU-like database protection laws, there giving copyright ownership to intelligent agents leads to
is a need to make a distinction between collections of an unworkable situation. Users of agents seem well-posi-
information for which investment was made to collect tioned to own the copyright, but from a doctrinal stand-
and verify existing materials (protected as a ‘‘database’’) point, they do not meet the requirement of authorship
and for which investment was made for creating new under copyright law. They are also not particularly well-
materials (not protected as a ‘‘database’’). In practice, this positioned to be defined as ‘‘makers’’ by the Canadian
may be a very difficult distinction to make. It certainly legislature, as that would be inconsistent with the intent
has been the case that the demarcation between compi- and policy goals of the Copyright Act. As a result, it is
lations and non-compilations under copyright in Canada concluded that the best solution is for no copyright own-
has been difficult to draw,105 so distinguishing between ership to be vested in anyone.
databases and non-databases may be just as difficult.
Preventing anyone from owning the copyright to
However, in all four judgments, the ECJ made it information generated by intelligent agents avoids inco-
clear that the purpose of the database directive is to herence in Canadian copyright law by preventing the
promote and protect investment in data storage and conflation of the notion of authorship with the notion of
processing systems for existing information, which con- ownership. It is also consistent with the need for the
tribute to the development of an information market. author to be one who ‘‘[s]ucceeds in exercising minimal
Incentive to create materials that are capable of being personal autonomy in her fashioning of the work’’. 110
collected subsequently in a database is not the proper Autonomy is one of the fundamental characteristics of
subject matter of database protection laws in the EU.106 agents exhibiting artificial intelligence, and while agents
As discussed in previous sections of this paper, the act of cannot be rights bearers, it should be recognized that
summarizing news items gathered from the Internet is they are the ones responsible for the originality of the
the result of the exercise of skill and judgment. However, works that they create.
if an agent’s activities are limited so that the agent will
It is important to note that not giving copyrightonly seek, collect, verify, and present existing materials,
ownership to anyone does not mean that there is nothen it is possible that such investment would attract
longer any incentive for human users and creators to useprotection under database legislation.
and create intelligent agent technologies. Investors andThese types of distinctions make eminent sense
programmers still have great incentive to develop newfrom a broader information policy perspective. As noted
technologies and license their use, as they may own theby one commentator, database law should focus on its
intellectual property over the technology itself. 111 Therepurpose, which is to serve the needs of commerce for
also still exists a great deal of incentive for human usersinvestment in commercial databases and avoid focus on
to use the intelligent agent to generate works. If the usercontent protection. 107
decides to extract commercial value from the output of
the intelligent agent, not having copyright ownership
over the output does not preclude the user from addingConclusion expressive value to it. As a result, the user may claim
ome commentators would argue that there is no copyright in expression he or she personally contributesS principled basis for not welcoming computer-gener- to the final product, but not on the raw output of the
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agent, extract commercial value out of it, and receive The aim of this paper is not to downplay the impor-
copyright protection for the portion of the expression tance of copyright law protection. Rather, it is to serve as
that he or she has actually authored. a caution against a natural urge and intuition to assign
copyright to computer-generated works created by intel-It might be argued that it would be difficult, if not
ligent agents without having first made careful delibera-impossible, to prove what original content the agent gen-
tion. Particularly where copyright protection is to beerated versus what valuable expression the user added,113
potentially extended into new areas, context-specific eco-but this is a question of evidence. Just because evidence
nomic analysis and empirical evidence of an actualmay be difficult to obtain does not render laws useless.
market failure may be quite helpful. If these works areIn fact, artificial intelligence technology itself may pro-
eventually brought within copyright law or some type ofvide a solution, by offering some sort of audit trail. Dig-
sui generis intellectual property protection regime, it isital rights management (DRM) technology has proven
important that broader information policy perspectivesthat technological solutions can create some very strong
are understood to properly limit the scope of the protec-boundaries for a user’s manipulation of digital informa-
tion given.tion. In fact, the effect of the existence of DRM and
technical protection measures (TPM) technology should
also be considered by policymakers when considering
copyright reform in this area.
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